Hegang Quality Flow Meter Control

『Hegang Quality Flow Meter Control』Related information(clamp on meter|electromagnetic meter|venturi meterrotameter|orifice meter|ultrasonic flow meter|mass flow meter|coriolis mass flow meter|coriolis flow meter|magnetic flow meter|magmeter flow meter|magflow flow meter|mag meter flow meter|electromagnetic flow meter|vortex flow meter|turbine flow meter|thermal mass flow meter|thermal flow meter|rotameter flow meter)

1. What are the potential safety hazards of the quantitative loading system for quality flow meters when leaving the factory? The potential safety hazards of the quantitative loading system for quality flow meters mainly focus on four dimensions: hardware assembly, software logic, safety protection matching, and compliance verification. If not properly investigated, it will lead to safety accidents such as material leakage, inaccurate measurement, and flammable medium explosion.

1. Hardware assembly hazards (1) Sealing system adaptation deviation 1 The selection of sealing components such as O-rings and corrugated pipes for the loading interface does not match the characteristics of the medium and working pressure. For example, low-temperature LNG loading uses room temperature nitrile rubber seals, which can cause leakage due to brittle seals at low disturbance bench temperatures; 2. The installation torque of the sealing element was not controlled according to the process requirements. If the torque is too small, the seal is not tight, and if it is too large, the sealing lip is squeezed and damaged, resulting in medium leakage after long-term operation. （2） The installation stress of the sensor has not been eliminated The mass flow meter is hard connected to the front and rear pipelines without reserved allowance for thermal expansion and contraction, or forcibly aligned during installation, resulting in additional stress on the sensor core, causing zero drift, decreased measurement accuracy, and in severe cases, damaging the internal vibrating string components; 2. The connection between the crane tube and the flowmeter did not use a flexible joint, and the vibration of the pipeline was transmitted to the fl

owmeter, exacerbating the wear of the movement. （3） Emergency execution agency linkage failure 1 The emergency shut-off valve and pneumatic crane locking mechanism of the loading system were only tested for individual power on without factory linkage verification. During actual loading, if the pipeline ruptures or the vehicle shifts, the shut-off valve cannot be activated in a timely manner; 2. The rated pulling force of the disconnect valve is not calibrated according to the working conditions of the loading area. If the pulling force is too high, it cannot break the pipeline in a timely manner when the vehicle moves, or if it is too low, it may trigger the disconnection incorrectly during normal loading and unloading. （4） Lack of anti-static grounding configuration 1 The grounding terminals of flow meters, crane tubes, and loading arms are not configured with jumper wires in accordance with the requirements of GB 50058-2014 "Code for Design of Electric Power Installations in Explosive Hazardous Environments", and static electricity cannot be effectively conducted, causing flash explosions when combustible media leaks.

II. Software Logic Hazards (1) Quantitative Control Logic Vulnerabilities 1 The threshold settings for excessive alarm and overflow protection did not match the rated capacity of the tanker truck, and a safety margin of 1% -2% was not reserved, resulting in excessive overflow during loading; 2. Communication interruption protection logic is missing. After the communication between the flowmeter and the sales information control room and PLC was disconnected, the system did not trigger the parking command, and continued loading caused the tanker to overflow. （2） Insufficient coverage of permissions

『SILVER Official Website SERVICE』